CWE-345 CVEs with a proof of concept
3 CVEs
Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
33.3%
No exploit published
2
66.7%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
3
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 2 / month
Sep 23Nov 23Jan 24Mar 24May 24Jul 24Sep 24Nov 24
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-53267 | Medium | 2024-11-26 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | sigstore-java is a sigstore java client for interacting with sigstore infrastructure. sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a validly-signed but "mismatched" bundle is presented as proof of inclusion into a transparency log. This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify(). The verifier may accept a bundle with an unrelated log entry, cryptographically verifying everything but fails to ensure the log entry applies to the artifact in question, thereby "verifying" a bundle without any proof the signing event was logged. This allows the creation of a bundle without fulcio certificate and private key combined with an unrelated but time-correct log entry to fake logging of a signing event. A malicious actor using a compromised identity may want to do this to prevent discovery via rekor's log monitors. The signer's identity will still be available to the verifier. The signature on the bundle must still be on the correct artifact for the verifier to pass. sigstore-gradle-plugin and sigstore-maven-plugin are not affected by this as they only provide signing functionality. This issue has been patched in v1.1.0 release with PR #856. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| CVE-2023-41045 | Medium | 2023-08-31 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Graylog is a free and open log management platform. Graylog makes use of only one single source port for DNS queries. Graylog binds a single socket for outgoing DNS queries and while that socket is bound to a random port number it is never changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query. Although unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog's lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically. This issue has been addressed in versions 5.0.9 and 5.1.3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue. |
| CVE-2023-0264 | Medium | 2023-08-04 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in Keycloaks OpenID Connect user authentication, which may incorrectly authenticate requests. An authenticated attacker who could obtain information from a user request within the same realm could use that data to impersonate the victim and generate new session tokens. This issue could impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability. |