WaratekVRT Sign in
Reset
More filters (2)
Columns
Including CVEs outside Waratek scope✕CWE CWE-311✕Has a public PoC✕
Overview 4 matches · 1 in Waratek scope · 1 protected · 3 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek 1 25.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0% Outside Waratek scope 0 0.0% Not applicable 3 75.0% Withdrawn CVE 0 0.0%
Critical 2 50.0% High 2 50.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 25.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 3 75.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 3 75.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 25.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 3 / year
2017201820192020202120222023202420252026
4 matches Sign in to download these CVEs as CSV or JSON, or to follow them in a feed.
CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-77812 Critical 2026-08-21 Not applicable Proof of concept only DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone's Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone's internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user. * An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone's network * The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices. * The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely * The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed * A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed Affected models are DJI Neo until 01.00.0400, DJI Neo 2 until 01.00.0500, DJI Flip until 01.00.1200, DJI Air 3 until 01.00.1600, DJI Air 3S until 01.00.1400, DJI Avata 2 until 01.00.0400, DJI Avata 360 until 01.00.0300, DJI Mavic 3 until 01.00.1400, DJI Mavic 3 Classic until 01.00.0800, DJI Mavic 3 Pro until 01.01.0700, DJI Mavic 4 Pro until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 2 until 01.07.0200, DJI Mini 3 until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 3 Pro until 01.00.0900, DJI Mini 4 Pro until 01.00.1100, and DJI Mini 5 Pro until 01.00.0600. Remediation requires a firmware update from the vendor. There is no user-side mitigation that fully addresses the vulnerability without upgrading.
CVE-2026-34486 High 2026-04-09 Protected by Waratek Exploited Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data vulnerability in Apache Tomcat due to the fix for CVE-2026-29146 allowing the bypass of the EncryptInterceptor. This issue affects Apache Tomcat: 11.0.20, 10.1.53, 9.0.116. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.21, 10.1.54 or 9.0.117, which fix the issue.
CVE-2026-27944 Critical 2026-03-05 Not applicable Exploited Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.3, the /api/backup endpoint is accessible without authentication and discloses the encryption keys required to decrypt the backup in the X-Backup-Security response header. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to download a full system backup containing sensitive data (user credentials, session tokens, SSL private keys, Nginx configurations) and decrypt it immediately. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.3.
CVE-2017-8221 High 2017-04-25 Not applicable Exploited Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM devices rely on a cleartext UDP tunnel protocol (aka the Cloud feature) for communication between an Android application and a camera device, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by sniffing the network.