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Published from 2018-04-01✕Published to 2018-06-30✕CWE CWE-310✕
Overview 4 matches · 3 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
4matches 3protected75.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 3 75.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 1 25.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 3 75.0% Medium 1 25.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 3 75.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 25.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 4 100.0%
split by peak 4 / month
No exploit published: 1Protected by Waratek: 3 Medium: 1High: 3 not blocked: 1blocked by ARMR today: 3 No public exploit: 4
Jun 18
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2016-1000352 High 2018-06-04 Protected by Waratek No public exploit In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the ECIES implementation allowed the use of ECB mode. This mode is regarded as unsafe and support for it has been removed from the provider.
CVE-2016-1000344 High 2018-06-04 Protected by Waratek No public exploit In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DHIES implementation allowed the use of ECB mode. This mode is regarded as unsafe and support for it has been removed from the provider.
CVE-2016-1000343 High 2018-06-04 Protected by Waratek No public exploit In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DSA key pair generator generates a weak private key if used with default values. If the JCA key pair generator is not explicitly initialised with DSA parameters, 1.55 and earlier generates a private value assuming a 1024 bit key size. In earlier releases this can be dealt with by explicitly passing parameters to the key pair generator.
CVE-2016-1000339 Medium 2018-06-04 No exploit published No public exploit In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the primary engine class used for AES was AESFastEngine. Due to the highly table driven approach used in the algorithm it turns out that if the data channel on the CPU can be monitored the lookup table accesses are sufficient to leak information on the AES key being used. There was also a leak in AESEngine although it was substantially less. AESEngine has been modified to remove any signs of leakage (testing carried out on Intel X86-64) and is now the primary AES class for the BC JCE provider from 1.56. Use of AESFastEngine is now only recommended where otherwise deemed appropriate.