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CWE CWE-184✕
Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 3 100.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 3 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 3 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 33.3% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 2 66.7%
split by peak 2 / month
No exploit published: 3 High: 3 not blocked: 3 No public exploit: 2Proof of concept only: 1
Jun 262 No exploit published2 High2 not blocked2 Proof of concept only1 No public exploit1 Jul 260 Aug 260 Sep 261 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1
Jun 26Jul 26Aug 26Sep 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-84218 High 2026-09-01 No exploit published No public exploit A flaw was found in Jolokia's JSR-160 proxy functionality where insufficient validation of client-controlled JMX service URLs allows a bypass of the denylist introduced to mitigate CVE-2018-1000130. The proxy accepts a `target.url` value from a Jolokia POST request and passes it to `JMXServiceURL` and `JMXConnectorFactory` for establishing the remote JMX connection. The existing denylist only rejects URLs matching `service:jmx:rmi:///jndi/ldap:.*`, which can be bypassed using alternative valid JMX service URL forms, including `ldaps://` schemes or LDAP URLs with a non-empty JMX host component. These URLs are accepted as valid `JMXServiceURL` objects and can cause the Jolokia agent JVM to perform a JNDI lookup against an attacker-controlled LDAP endpoint. This can result in server-side request forgery (SSRF), forwarding of supplied JMX credentials to the remote endpoint, and potentially remote code execution depending on the classes and configuration available in the target JVM.
CVE-2026-54513 High 2026-06-23 No exploit published No public exploit jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-54512 High 2026-06-23 No exploit published Proof of concept only jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.