WaratekVRT Sign in
Reset
More filters (1)
Columns
Including CVEs outside Waratek scope✕CWE CWE-159✕
Overview 2 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches 0in Waratek scope0.0% 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 1public PoC50.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0% Outside Waratek scope 0 0.0% Not applicable 2 100.0% Withdrawn CVE 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 2 100.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 2 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 2 100.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / month
Jun 25Jul 25Aug 25Sep 25Oct 25
2 matches Sign in to download these CVEs as CSV or JSON, or to follow them in a feed.
CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2025-61984 Low 2025-10-06 Not applicable Proof of concept only ssh in OpenSSH before 10.1 allows control characters in usernames that originate from certain possibly untrusted sources, potentially leading to code execution when a ProxyCommand is used. The untrusted sources are the command line and %-sequence expansion of a configuration file. (A configuration file that provides a complete literal username is not categorized as an untrusted source.)
CVE-2025-52884 Low 2025-06-24 Not applicable Proof of concept only RISC Zero is a zero-knowledge verifiable general computing platform, with Ethereum integration. The risc0-ethereum repository contains Solidity verifier contracts, Steel EVM view call library, and supporting code. Prior to versions 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero. This violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel and leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of a program using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs. A fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` 2.1.1 and 2.2.0. Users for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action. Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.