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Oracle Enterprise Manager Security Framework (jackson-databind) CVEs with a proof of concept

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Oracle product: Oracle Enterprise Manager / Security Framework (jackson-databind)✕
Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 1public PoC33.3% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 33.3% No exploit published 2 66.7%
Critical 1 33.3% High 1 33.3% Medium 1 33.3% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 3 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 3 100.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / year
2020202120222023202420252026
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-54512 High 2026-06-23 No exploit published Proof of concept only jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
CVE-2025-49128 Medium 2025-06-06 No exploit published Proof of concept only Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.13.0, a flaw in jackson-core's `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x. This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #652. All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by disabling exception message exposure to clients to avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses and/or disabling source inclusion in exceptions to prevent Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage.
CVE-2020-8840 Critical 2020-02-10 Mitigation candidate Proof of concept only FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 through 2.9.10.2 lacks certain xbean-reflect/JNDI blocking, as demonstrated by org.apache.xbean.propertyeditor.JndiConverter.