Overview 3 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
3
100.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
33.3%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
66.7%
split by
peak 2 / month
Dec 24Jan 25Feb 25Mar 25Apr 25May 25Jun 25Jul 25Aug 25Sep 25
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-9086 | High | 2025-09-12 | Not applicable | No public exploit | 1. A cookie is set using the `secure` keyword for `https://target` 2. curl is redirected to or otherwise made to speak with `http://target` (same hostname, but using clear text HTTP) using the same cookie set 3. The same cookie name is set - but with only a slash as path (`path="/"`). Since this site is not secure, the cookie *should* be ignored. 4. A bug in the path comparison logic makes curl read outside a heap buffer boundary The bug either causes a crash or it potentially makes the comparison come to the wrong conclusion and lets the clear-text site override the contents of the secure cookie, contrary to expectations and depending on the memory contents immediately following the single-byte allocation that holds the path. The presumed and correct behavior would be to plainly ignore the second set of the cookie since it was already set as secure on a secure host so overriding it on an insecure host should not be okay. |
| CVE-2025-10148 | Medium | 2025-09-12 | Not applicable | No public exploit | curl's WebSocket code did not update the 32-bit mask pattern for each new outgoing frame as the specification says. Instead it used a fixed mask that persisted and was used throughout the entire connection. A predictable mask pattern allows for a malicious server to induce traffic between the two communicating parties that could be interpreted by an involved proxy (configured or transparent) as genuine, real, HTTP traffic with content and thereby poison its cache. That cached poisoned content could then be served to all users of that proxy. |
| CVE-2024-11053 | Low | 2024-12-11 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | When asked to both use a `.netrc` file for credentials and to follow HTTP redirects, curl could leak the password used for the first host to the followed-to host under certain circumstances. This flaw only manifests itself if the netrc file has an entry that matches the redirect target hostname but the entry either omits just the password or omits both login and password. |