Overview 4 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
4matches
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
4
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
4
100.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
25.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
75.0%
split by
peak 4 / month
Jul 23
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-37895 | Critical | 2023-07-25 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Java object deserialization issue in Jackrabbit webapp/standalone on all platforms allows attacker to remotely execute code via RMIVersions up to (including) 2.20.10 (stable branch) and 2.21.17 (unstable branch) use the component "commons-beanutils", which contains a class that can be used for remote code execution over RMI. Users are advised to immediately update to versions 2.20.11 or 2.21.18. Note that earlier stable branches (1.0.x .. 2.18.x) have been EOLd already and do not receive updates anymore. In general, RMI support can expose vulnerabilities by the mere presence of an exploitable class on the classpath. Even if Jackrabbit itself does not contain any code known to be exploitable anymore, adding other components to your server can expose the same type of problem. We therefore recommend to disable RMI access altogether (see further below), and will discuss deprecating RMI support in future Jackrabbit releases. How to check whether RMI support is enabledRMI support can be over an RMI-specific TCP port, and over an HTTP binding. Both are by default enabled in Jackrabbit webapp/standalone. The native RMI protocol by default uses port 1099. To check whether it is enabled, tools like "netstat" can be used to check. RMI-over-HTTP in Jackrabbit by default uses the path "/rmi". So when running standalone on port 8080, check whether an HTTP GET request on localhost:8080/rmi returns 404 (not enabled) or 200 (enabled). Note that the HTTP path may be different when the webapp is deployed in a container as non-root context, in which case the prefix is under the user's control. Turning off RMIFind web.xml (either in JAR/WAR file or in unpacked web application folder), and remove the declaration and the mapping definition for the RemoteBindingServlet: <servlet> <servlet-name>RMI</servlet-name> <servlet-class>org.apache.jackrabbit.servlet.remote.RemoteBindingServlet</servlet-class> </servlet> <servlet-mapping> <servlet-name>RMI</servlet-name> <url-pattern>/rmi</url-pattern> </servlet-mapping> Find the bootstrap.properties file (in $REPOSITORY_HOME), and set rmi.enabled=false and also remove rmi.host rmi.port rmi.url-pattern If there is no file named bootstrap.properties in $REPOSITORY_HOME, it is located somewhere in the classpath. In this case, place a copy in $REPOSITORY_HOME and modify it as explained. |
| CVE-2023-34434 | High | 2023-07-25 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability in Apache Software Foundation Apache InLong.This issue affects Apache InLong: from 1.4.0 through 1.7.0. The attacker could bypass the current logic and achieve arbitrary file reading. To solve it, users are advised to upgrade to Apache InLong's 1.8.0 or cherry-pick https://github.com/apache/inlong/pull/8130 . |
| CVE-2023-26512 | Critical | 2023-07-17 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data at the rabbitmq-connector plugin module in Apache EventMesh (incubating) V1.7.0\V1.8.0 on windows\linux\mac os e.g. platforms allows attackers to send controlled message and remote code execute via rabbitmq messages. Users can use the code under the master branch in project repo to fix this issue, we will release the new version as soon as possible. |
| CVE-2023-38286 | High | 2023-07-14 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | Thymeleaf through 3.1.1.RELEASE, as used in spring-boot-admin (aka Spring Boot Admin) through 3.1.1 and other products, allows sandbox bypass via crafted HTML. This may be relevant for SSTI (Server Side Template Injection) and code execution in spring-boot-admin if MailNotifier is enabled and there is write access to environment variables via the UI. |