Overview 2 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
2
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
2
100.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
2
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-34050 | Medium | 2023-10-19 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | In spring AMQP versions 1.0.0 to 2.4.16 and 3.0.0 to 3.0.9 , allowed list patterns for deserializable class names were added to Spring AMQP, allowing users to lock down deserialization of data in messages from untrusted sources; however by default, when no allowed list was provided, all classes could be deserialized. Specifically, an application is vulnerable if * the SimpleMessageConverter or SerializerMessageConverter is used * the user does not configure allowed list patterns * untrusted message originators gain permissions to write messages to the RabbitMQ broker to send malicious content |
| CVE-2011-2894 | Medium | 2011-10-04 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | Spring Framework 3.0.0 through 3.0.5, Spring Security 3.0.0 through 3.0.5 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.6, and possibly other versions deserialize objects from untrusted sources, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended security restrictions and execute untrusted code by (1) serializing a java.lang.Proxy instance and using InvocationHandler, or (2) accessing internal AOP interfaces, as demonstrated using deserialization of a DefaultListableBeanFactory instance to execute arbitrary commands via the java.lang.Runtime class. |