CVEs · Protected by RASP · Unknown

CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2026-86460	Unknown	2026-09-14	Protected by RASP	No public exploit	Cypher injection vulnerability in the Neo4j persistence layer when processing some FIQL search conditions. This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.
CVE-2026-82428	Unknown	2026-09-14	Protected by RASP	No public exploit	Description Dependency artifacts uploaded with `storm jar --artifacts` were stored under a blob key derived only from the Maven coordinate, for example `dep---.jar`. The key was therefore identical for every user of the cluster and predictable in advance. When the blob already existed, the uploader caught `KeyAlreadyExistsException` and silently reused it, with no check that the existing blob's content or owner matched the artifact the submitter had resolved. A user who uploaded a blob under such a key first therefore controlled the bytes that every later submitter of the same coordinate would receive on the worker classpath, resulting in code execution inside another tenant's topology. This affects deployments where more than one principal may create blobs and where the `--artifacts` dependency feature is used. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where each uploaded artifact receives a key carrying a freshly generated UUID and a pre-existing blob is no longer silently reused. Note that the corrected key generation is on the SUBMITTING CLIENT, so upgrading the cluster alone does not close this; every client that runs `storm jar --artifacts` must also be upgraded. Operators should audit existing `dep-` blobs for unexpected owners before upgrading. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should avoid the `--artifacts` mechanism in multi-tenant clusters and distribute dependencies inside the topology jar instead. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
CVE-2026-82427	Unknown	2026-09-14	Protected by RASP	No public exploit	Description A topology's `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link. A submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before they reach Nimbus. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
CVE-2026-82426	Unknown	2026-09-14	Protected by RASP	No public exploit	Description Nimbus accepted the `uploadedJarLocation` argument of `submitTopology` / `submitTopologyWithOpts` as a server-side path and opened it directly, without checking that it referred to a file the caller had actually uploaded. The intended flow is that a client first calls `beginFileUpload`, which returns a path inside the Nimbus inbox, and uploads the jar in chunks to that location; nothing bound submission to that flow, and the `uploaders` map populated by `beginFileUpload` was never consulted at submit time. An authenticated user with topology submission rights could therefore submit any path readable by the Nimbus daemon user as their topology jar. Nimbus copied the file into the topology's jar blob, and the blob ACL grants the submitting subject read access, so the contents could then be retrieved with the ordinary blob download RPCs. Candidate targets include the Nimbus Kerberos keytab, Thrift and UI TLS private keys, and `storm.yaml` with the ZooKeeper authentication payload. Possession of the Nimbus keytab turns an ordinary tenant into a cluster administrator. In a deployment configured as the documentation recommends, submission is available to every authenticated principal when `nimbus.users` is unset, so no elevated privilege is required. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the submitted location is canonicalised and must resolve inside the Nimbus inbox. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals via `nimbus.users` or `nimbus.groups`, and should treat any file readable by the Nimbus daemon user as potentially exposed to submitters: rotate the Nimbus keytab and any TLS private keys or ZooKeeper credentials reachable from that account. Local mode is unaffected. Credit Independently reported to the Apache Storm PMC by n0mi1k, with a proof of concept. Also found by the ASF using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
CVE-2026-82232	Unknown	2026-09-14	Protected by RASP	No public exploit	Improper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command ('SQL injection') vulnerability in Apache Syncope. An administrator with adequate entitlements can achieve execution of arbitrary SQL via stacked queries, leveraging unsanitized sort clauses for Task search. This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.
CVE-2026-77051	Unknown	2026-09-14	Protected by RASP	No public exploit	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Apache Syncope. An administrator with adequate entitlements can achieve execution of arbitrary SQL via stacked queries, leveraging unsanitized entityKey and opEvent parameters. This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 Through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.
CVE-2026-67211	Unknown	2026-09-11	Protected by RASP	No public exploit	OOM Denial of Service via Unbounded Map Pre-Sizing in Apache OpenNLP SymSpellModelSerializer Versions Affected: - 3.0.0-M4 - 3.0.0-M5 (The opennlp-spellcheck extension was introduced in 3.0.0-M4. Releases 1.x and 2.x do not contain the affected code.) Description: The SymSpellModelSerializer.create() method reads two 32-bit signed integer count fields (unigramCount and bigramCount) from a binary SymSpell model stream and passes each value directly to LinkedHashMap.newLinkedHashMap() after validating only that it is non-negative. No upper bound is applied, so the count is fully attacker-controlled when the model file originates from an untrusted source. A crafted .bin model file in which either count field is set to Integer.MAX_VALUE (or any value large enough to exhaust the available heap) causes the map to be pre-sized to a capacity of 2^30 entries. The oversized backing array is allocated on the first put() into that map, requesting 4–8 GB depending on whether compressed oops are in effect, and the load fails with an OutOfMemoryError. Because the count fields sit immediately after a fixed-size header (magic, format version, three UTF strings, the configuration fields, and the edit-distance identifier) the attacker pays no meaningful size cost to weaponize a payload: a file of well under 100 bytes plus a single real entry is sufficient to crash a JVM that loads it. Any code path that deserializes a SymSpell model is affected, including SymSpellModels.deserialize(InputStream), SymSpellModels.fromBytes(byte[]), classpath model loading via SymSpellModelResolver.resolveByLanguage(String), the CorrectTextTool command-line tool, and model-archive loading through the registered ArtifactSerializer. The opennlp-spellcheck extension ships in the official OpenNLP binary distribution. The practical impact is denial of service against processes that load SymSpell model files from untrusted or semi-trusted origins. Mitigation: - 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M6. Note: The fix applies an upper bound to both count fields, checked before the map is pre-sized; counts that are negative or exceed the bound cause an IOException to be thrown and the read to fail fast with no large allocation. The bound is the existing AbstractModelReader.MAX_ENTRIES limit introduced earlie, which the current change promotes to public visibility so that serializers implementing their own binary format can share it. The default bound is 10,000,000, which is well above the entry counts of legitimate SymSpell dictionaries but far below any value that would threaten heap exhaustion. Deployments that legitimately need to load larger dictionaries can raise the limit at JVM startup by setting the OPENNLP_MAX_ENTRIES system property to the desired positive integer (e.g. -DOPENNLP_MAX_ENTRIES=50000000); invalid or non-positive values fall back to the default. Note that this property is shared with the model-reader limit and raising it relaxes both. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should treat all SymSpell .bin model files as untrusted input unless their provenance is verified, and should avoid loading models supplied by end users or fetched from third-party repositories without integrity checks.
CVE-2024-49203	Unknown	2024-11-20	Protected by RASP	Proof of concept only	Querydsl 5.1.0 and OpenFeign Querydsl 6.8 allows SQL/HQL injection in orderBy in JPAQuery. NOTE: this is disputed by a Querydsl community member because the product is not intended to defend against a developer who uses untrusted input directly in query construction.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2026-86460

Unknown

2026-09-14

Protected by RASP

No public exploit

Cypher injection vulnerability in the Neo4j persistence layer when processing some FIQL search conditions. This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.

CVE-2026-82428

Unknown

2026-09-14

Protected by RASP

No public exploit

Description Dependency artifacts uploaded with `storm jar --artifacts` were stored under a blob key derived only from the Maven coordinate, for example `dep---.jar`. The key was therefore identical for every user of the cluster and predictable in advance. When the blob already existed, the uploader caught `KeyAlreadyExistsException` and silently reused it, with no check that the existing blob's content or owner matched the artifact the submitter had resolved. A user who uploaded a blob under such a key first therefore controlled the bytes that every later submitter of the same coordinate would receive on the worker classpath, resulting in code execution inside another tenant's topology. This affects deployments where more than one principal may create blobs and where the `--artifacts` dependency feature is used. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where each uploaded artifact receives a key carrying a freshly generated UUID and a pre-existing blob is no longer silently reused. Note that the corrected key generation is on the SUBMITTING CLIENT, so upgrading the cluster alone does not close this; every client that runs `storm jar --artifacts` must also be upgraded. Operators should audit existing `dep-` blobs for unexpected owners before upgrading. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should avoid the `--artifacts` mechanism in multi-tenant clusters and distribute dependencies inside the topology jar instead. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

CVE-2026-82427

Unknown

2026-09-14

Protected by RASP

No public exploit

Description A topology's `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link. A submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before they reach Nimbus. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

CVE-2026-82426

Unknown

2026-09-14

Protected by RASP

No public exploit

Description Nimbus accepted the `uploadedJarLocation` argument of `submitTopology` / `submitTopologyWithOpts` as a server-side path and opened it directly, without checking that it referred to a file the caller had actually uploaded. The intended flow is that a client first calls `beginFileUpload`, which returns a path inside the Nimbus inbox, and uploads the jar in chunks to that location; nothing bound submission to that flow, and the `uploaders` map populated by `beginFileUpload` was never consulted at submit time. An authenticated user with topology submission rights could therefore submit any path readable by the Nimbus daemon user as their topology jar. Nimbus copied the file into the topology's jar blob, and the blob ACL grants the submitting subject read access, so the contents could then be retrieved with the ordinary blob download RPCs. Candidate targets include the Nimbus Kerberos keytab, Thrift and UI TLS private keys, and `storm.yaml` with the ZooKeeper authentication payload. Possession of the Nimbus keytab turns an ordinary tenant into a cluster administrator. In a deployment configured as the documentation recommends, submission is available to every authenticated principal when `nimbus.users` is unset, so no elevated privilege is required. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the submitted location is canonicalised and must resolve inside the Nimbus inbox. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals via `nimbus.users` or `nimbus.groups`, and should treat any file readable by the Nimbus daemon user as potentially exposed to submitters: rotate the Nimbus keytab and any TLS private keys or ZooKeeper credentials reachable from that account. Local mode is unaffected. Credit Independently reported to the Apache Storm PMC by n0mi1k, with a proof of concept. Also found by the ASF using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

CVE-2026-82232

Unknown

2026-09-14

Protected by RASP

No public exploit

Improper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command ('SQL injection') vulnerability in Apache Syncope. An administrator with adequate entitlements can achieve execution of arbitrary SQL via stacked queries, leveraging unsanitized sort clauses for Task search. This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.

CVE-2026-77051

Unknown

2026-09-14

Protected by RASP

No public exploit

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Apache Syncope. An administrator with adequate entitlements can achieve execution of arbitrary SQL via stacked queries, leveraging unsanitized entityKey and opEvent parameters. This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 Through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.

CVE-2026-67211

Unknown

2026-09-11

Protected by RASP

No public exploit

OOM Denial of Service via Unbounded Map Pre-Sizing in Apache OpenNLP SymSpellModelSerializer Versions Affected: - 3.0.0-M4 - 3.0.0-M5 (The opennlp-spellcheck extension was introduced in 3.0.0-M4. Releases 1.x and 2.x do not contain the affected code.) Description: The SymSpellModelSerializer.create() method reads two 32-bit signed integer count fields (unigramCount and bigramCount) from a binary SymSpell model stream and passes each value directly to LinkedHashMap.newLinkedHashMap() after validating only that it is non-negative. No upper bound is applied, so the count is fully attacker-controlled when the model file originates from an untrusted source. A crafted .bin model file in which either count field is set to Integer.MAX_VALUE (or any value large enough to exhaust the available heap) causes the map to be pre-sized to a capacity of 2^30 entries. The oversized backing array is allocated on the first put() into that map, requesting 4–8 GB depending on whether compressed oops are in effect, and the load fails with an OutOfMemoryError. Because the count fields sit immediately after a fixed-size header (magic, format version, three UTF strings, the configuration fields, and the edit-distance identifier) the attacker pays no meaningful size cost to weaponize a payload: a file of well under 100 bytes plus a single real entry is sufficient to crash a JVM that loads it. Any code path that deserializes a SymSpell model is affected, including SymSpellModels.deserialize(InputStream), SymSpellModels.fromBytes(byte[]), classpath model loading via SymSpellModelResolver.resolveByLanguage(String), the CorrectTextTool command-line tool, and model-archive loading through the registered ArtifactSerializer. The opennlp-spellcheck extension ships in the official OpenNLP binary distribution. The practical impact is denial of service against processes that load SymSpell model files from untrusted or semi-trusted origins. Mitigation: - 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M6. Note: The fix applies an upper bound to both count fields, checked before the map is pre-sized; counts that are negative or exceed the bound cause an IOException to be thrown and the read to fail fast with no large allocation. The bound is the existing AbstractModelReader.MAX_ENTRIES limit introduced earlie, which the current change promotes to public visibility so that serializers implementing their own binary format can share it. The default bound is 10,000,000, which is well above the entry counts of legitimate SymSpell dictionaries but far below any value that would threaten heap exhaustion. Deployments that legitimately need to load larger dictionaries can raise the limit at JVM startup by setting the OPENNLP_MAX_ENTRIES system property to the desired positive integer (e.g. -DOPENNLP_MAX_ENTRIES=50000000); invalid or non-positive values fall back to the default. Note that this property is shared with the model-reader limit and raising it relaxes both. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should treat all SymSpell .bin model files as untrusted input unless their provenance is verified, and should avoid loading models supplied by end users or fetched from third-party repositories without integrity checks.

CVE-2024-49203

Unknown

2024-11-20

Protected by RASP

Proof of concept only

Querydsl 5.1.0 and OpenFeign Querydsl 6.8 allows SQL/HQL injection in orderBy in JPAQuery. NOTE: this is disputed by a Querydsl community member because the product is not intended to defend against a developer who uses untrusted input directly in query construction.