Oracle PeopleSoft / Security, Porting, Cloud Deployment Architecture (OpenSSL) CVEs

CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2025-4575	Medium	2025-05-22	Not applicable	No public exploit	Issue summary: Use of -addreject option with the openssl x509 application adds a trusted use instead of a rejected use for a certificate. Impact summary: If a user intends to make a trusted certificate rejected for a particular use it will be instead marked as trusted for that use. A copy & paste error during minor refactoring of the code introduced this issue in the OpenSSL 3.5 version. If, for example, a trusted CA certificate should be trusted only for the purpose of authenticating TLS servers but not for CMS signature verification and the CMS signature verification is intended to be marked as rejected with the -addreject option, the resulting CA certificate will be trusted for CMS signature verification purpose instead. Only users which use the trusted certificate format who use the openssl x509 command line application to add rejected uses are affected by this issue. The issues affecting only the command line application are considered to be Low severity. The FIPS modules in 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1, 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are also not affected by this issue.
CVE-2024-9143	Medium	2024-10-16	Not applicable	No public exploit	Issue summary: Use of the low-level GF(2^m) elliptic curve APIs with untrusted explicit values for the field polynomial can lead to out-of-bounds memory reads or writes. Impact summary: Out of bound memory writes can lead to an application crash or even a possibility of a remote code execution, however, in all the protocols involving Elliptic Curve Cryptography that we're aware of, either only "named curves" are supported, or, if explicit curve parameters are supported, they specify an X9.62 encoding of binary (GF(2^m)) curves that can't represent problematic input values. Thus the likelihood of existence of a vulnerable application is low. In particular, the X9.62 encoding is used for ECC keys in X.509 certificates, so problematic inputs cannot occur in the context of processing X.509 certificates. Any problematic use-cases would have to be using an "exotic" curve encoding. The affected APIs include: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(), EC_GROUP_new_from_params(), and various supporting BN_GF2m_*() functions. Applications working with "exotic" explicit binary (GF(2^m)) curve parameters, that make it possible to represent invalid field polynomials with a zero constant term, via the above or similar APIs, may terminate abruptly as a result of reading or writing outside of array bounds. Remote code execution cannot easily be ruled out. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.
CVE-2024-5535	Critical	2024-06-27	Not applicable	No public exploit	Issue summary: Calling the OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto with an empty supported client protocols buffer may cause a crash or memory contents to be sent to the peer. Impact summary: A buffer overread can have a range of potential consequences such as unexpected application beahviour or a crash. In particular this issue could result in up to 255 bytes of arbitrary private data from memory being sent to the peer leading to a loss of confidentiality. However, only applications that directly call the SSL_select_next_proto function with a 0 length list of supported client protocols are affected by this issue. This would normally never be a valid scenario and is typically not under attacker control but may occur by accident in the case of a configuration or programming error in the calling application. The OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto is typically used by TLS applications that support ALPN (Application Layer Protocol Negotiation) or NPN (Next Protocol Negotiation). NPN is older, was never standardised and is deprecated in favour of ALPN. We believe that ALPN is significantly more widely deployed than NPN. The SSL_select_next_proto function accepts a list of protocols from the server and a list of protocols from the client and returns the first protocol that appears in the server list that also appears in the client list. In the case of no overlap between the two lists it returns the first item in the client list. In either case it will signal whether an overlap between the two lists was found. In the case where SSL_select_next_proto is called with a zero length client list it fails to notice this condition and returns the memory immediately following the client list pointer (and reports that there was no overlap in the lists). This function is typically called from a server side application callback for ALPN or a client side application callback for NPN. In the case of ALPN the list of protocols supplied by the client is guaranteed by libssl to never be zero in length. The list of server protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. In this case if the SSL_select_next_proto function has been called as expected (with the list supplied by the client passed in the client/client_len parameters), then the application will not be vulnerable to this issue. If the application has accidentally been configured with a zero length server list, and has accidentally passed that zero length server list in the client/client_len parameters, and has additionally failed to correctly handle a "no overlap" response (which would normally result in a handshake failure in ALPN) then it will be vulnerable to this problem. In the case of NPN, the protocol permits the client to opportunistically select a protocol when there is no overlap. OpenSSL returns the first client protocol in the no overlap case in support of this. The list of client protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. However if the SSL_select_next_proto function is accidentally called with a client_len of 0 then an invalid memory pointer will be returned instead. If the application uses this output as the opportunistic protocol then the loss of confidentiality will occur. This issue has been assessed as Low severity because applications are most likely to be vulnerable if they are using NPN instead of ALPN - but NPN is not widely used. It also requires an application configuration or programming error. Finally, this issue would not typically be under attacker control making active exploitation unlikely. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included in the next releases when they become available.
CVE-2024-0727	Medium	2024-01-26	Not applicable	No public exploit	Issue summary: Processing a maliciously formatted PKCS12 file may lead OpenSSL to crash leading to a potential Denial of Service attack Impact summary: Applications loading files in the PKCS12 format from untrusted sources might terminate abruptly. A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may come from an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields to be NULL, but OpenSSL does not correctly check for this case. This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference that results in OpenSSL crashing. If an application processes PKCS12 files from an untrusted source using the OpenSSL APIs then that application will be vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL APIs that are vulnerable to this are: PKCS12_parse(), PKCS12_unpack_p7data(), PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(), PKCS12_unpack_authsafes() and PKCS12_newpass(). We have also fixed a similar issue in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). However since this function is related to writing data we do not consider it security significant. The FIPS modules in 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2025-4575

Medium

2025-05-22

Not applicable

No public exploit

Issue summary: Use of -addreject option with the openssl x509 application adds a trusted use instead of a rejected use for a certificate. Impact summary: If a user intends to make a trusted certificate rejected for a particular use it will be instead marked as trusted for that use. A copy & paste error during minor refactoring of the code introduced this issue in the OpenSSL 3.5 version. If, for example, a trusted CA certificate should be trusted only for the purpose of authenticating TLS servers but not for CMS signature verification and the CMS signature verification is intended to be marked as rejected with the -addreject option, the resulting CA certificate will be trusted for CMS signature verification purpose instead. Only users which use the trusted certificate format who use the openssl x509 command line application to add rejected uses are affected by this issue. The issues affecting only the command line application are considered to be Low severity. The FIPS modules in 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1, 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are also not affected by this issue.

CVE-2024-9143

Medium

2024-10-16

Not applicable

No public exploit

Issue summary: Use of the low-level GF(2^m) elliptic curve APIs with untrusted explicit values for the field polynomial can lead to out-of-bounds memory reads or writes. Impact summary: Out of bound memory writes can lead to an application crash or even a possibility of a remote code execution, however, in all the protocols involving Elliptic Curve Cryptography that we're aware of, either only "named curves" are supported, or, if explicit curve parameters are supported, they specify an X9.62 encoding of binary (GF(2^m)) curves that can't represent problematic input values. Thus the likelihood of existence of a vulnerable application is low. In particular, the X9.62 encoding is used for ECC keys in X.509 certificates, so problematic inputs cannot occur in the context of processing X.509 certificates. Any problematic use-cases would have to be using an "exotic" curve encoding. The affected APIs include: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(), EC_GROUP_new_from_params(), and various supporting BN_GF2m_*() functions. Applications working with "exotic" explicit binary (GF(2^m)) curve parameters, that make it possible to represent invalid field polynomials with a zero constant term, via the above or similar APIs, may terminate abruptly as a result of reading or writing outside of array bounds. Remote code execution cannot easily be ruled out. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.

CVE-2024-5535

Critical

2024-06-27

Not applicable

No public exploit

Issue summary: Calling the OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto with an empty supported client protocols buffer may cause a crash or memory contents to be sent to the peer. Impact summary: A buffer overread can have a range of potential consequences such as unexpected application beahviour or a crash. In particular this issue could result in up to 255 bytes of arbitrary private data from memory being sent to the peer leading to a loss of confidentiality. However, only applications that directly call the SSL_select_next_proto function with a 0 length list of supported client protocols are affected by this issue. This would normally never be a valid scenario and is typically not under attacker control but may occur by accident in the case of a configuration or programming error in the calling application. The OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto is typically used by TLS applications that support ALPN (Application Layer Protocol Negotiation) or NPN (Next Protocol Negotiation). NPN is older, was never standardised and is deprecated in favour of ALPN. We believe that ALPN is significantly more widely deployed than NPN. The SSL_select_next_proto function accepts a list of protocols from the server and a list of protocols from the client and returns the first protocol that appears in the server list that also appears in the client list. In the case of no overlap between the two lists it returns the first item in the client list. In either case it will signal whether an overlap between the two lists was found. In the case where SSL_select_next_proto is called with a zero length client list it fails to notice this condition and returns the memory immediately following the client list pointer (and reports that there was no overlap in the lists). This function is typically called from a server side application callback for ALPN or a client side application callback for NPN. In the case of ALPN the list of protocols supplied by the client is guaranteed by libssl to never be zero in length. The list of server protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. In this case if the SSL_select_next_proto function has been called as expected (with the list supplied by the client passed in the client/client_len parameters), then the application will not be vulnerable to this issue. If the application has accidentally been configured with a zero length server list, and has accidentally passed that zero length server list in the client/client_len parameters, and has additionally failed to correctly handle a "no overlap" response (which would normally result in a handshake failure in ALPN) then it will be vulnerable to this problem. In the case of NPN, the protocol permits the client to opportunistically select a protocol when there is no overlap. OpenSSL returns the first client protocol in the no overlap case in support of this. The list of client protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. However if the SSL_select_next_proto function is accidentally called with a client_len of 0 then an invalid memory pointer will be returned instead. If the application uses this output as the opportunistic protocol then the loss of confidentiality will occur. This issue has been assessed as Low severity because applications are most likely to be vulnerable if they are using NPN instead of ALPN - but NPN is not widely used. It also requires an application configuration or programming error. Finally, this issue would not typically be under attacker control making active exploitation unlikely. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included in the next releases when they become available.

CVE-2024-0727

Medium

2024-01-26

Not applicable

No public exploit

Issue summary: Processing a maliciously formatted PKCS12 file may lead OpenSSL to crash leading to a potential Denial of Service attack Impact summary: Applications loading files in the PKCS12 format from untrusted sources might terminate abruptly. A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may come from an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields to be NULL, but OpenSSL does not correctly check for this case. This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference that results in OpenSSL crashing. If an application processes PKCS12 files from an untrusted source using the OpenSSL APIs then that application will be vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL APIs that are vulnerable to this are: PKCS12_parse(), PKCS12_unpack_p7data(), PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(), PKCS12_unpack_authsafes() and PKCS12_newpass(). We have also fixed a similar issue in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). However since this function is related to writing data we do not consider it security significant. The FIPS modules in 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.